Fundraisly
AI fundraising agent that finds investors and books meetings Discussion | Link
AI人工智能最新资讯、模型发布、研究进展
AI fundraising agent that finds investors and books meetings Discussion | Link
A colleague said something to me recently that I keep coming back to: "Often, by the time you've finished articulating a complex problem for the AI, you've already solved it yourself." It sounds almost like a joke. You open a chat window, start typing out your problem in careful detail — and somewhere in the middle of the second paragraph, the answer appears. Not from the AI. From you. If you've worked with LLMs seriously, you've probably experienced this. And I think it points to something important about what is actually changing in our craft — something that goes beyond the usual conversation about automation and job displacement. The Rubber Duck, Promoted Developers have known for decades that explaining a problem out loud helps solve it. The classic technique involves a rubber duck: you place it on your desk, narrate your code to it, and the act of articulation forces you to confront the assumptions you'd quietly made. The duck never responds. That's not the point. The LLM is a rubber duck that occasionally says something useful back. But even when it doesn't — even when the response is generic or slightly off — the discipline of formulating the prompt has already done its work. You've had to be precise. You've had to strip away ambiguity. You've had to decide what actually matters. That process is not a workaround. It is thinking. The Inversion of the Workflow In the pre-AI era, the typical development workflow looked something like this: you had a rough mental model of the solution, you started coding, and you discovered the edge cases along the way. The code was exploratory. The thinking happened during the writing. With AI assistance, that workflow inverts. Vague inputs produce vague outputs — the model has no way to compensate for an underspecified problem. So precision becomes mandatory upfront. You have to think before you type, not while you type. This is a more demanding cognitive posture. It requires holding the full shape of a problem in your head be
Threat-intel reports from recent years document campaigns in which attackers obtain AWS IAM credentials from developer workstations, use them to enumerate cloud accounts and access Kubernetes clusters. From there, attackers deploy poisoned container images to move laterally and harvest secrets. The MITRE ATT&CK chain maps to: T1552.001 ( Credentials in Files ) → T1078.004 ( Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts ) → T1610 ( Deploy Container ) → T1496 ( Resource Hijacking ). This is not an isolated case. The Shai-Hulud supply chain attack harvested Kubernetes credentials from CI and developer workstations, feeding exactly this kind of attack chain. This research started with a short list of questions: What are Kubernetes secrets, exactly? What can an attacker do with them? How can defenders harden their clusters? So before we look at what we found in the wild, and how to harden clusters to mitigate impacts, let's define what Kubernetes secrets are. Three Surfaces, Three Secret Formats A simplified view of the cluster has three sides that matter for this post: A developer, or automation pipeline, talks to the Kubernetes API server with credentials. That is the canonical front door. On every node, the kubelet exposes its own HTTPS API. The same credentials can authenticate to it directly when it is reachable on the network. The cluster's nodes pull images from container registries (Docker Hub, GitHub Container Registry, ECR, Quay, GitLab, ACR…) using a second set of credentials. Kubernetes Architecture These are the attack surfaces where leaked secrets have the most impact, and three secret formats unlock them: TLS client certificates are used by humans through a kubeconfig file with the kubectl command to connect to a Kubernetes cluster. JSON Web Tokens, or Service Accounts, are non-human identities (NHI) used to automate cluster operations from CI/CD jobs, controllers, and integrations. By default, JWTs have no expiration date — which is why a JWT leaked years ago can still
You took the offer. The team uses Cursor or Copilot for almost every PR, runs an internal RAG bot over the docs, and at least one senior engineer is building agent workflows on the side. Your onboarding doc is half-written because the person who owned it left, and the codebase has roughly 40% more surface area than the org chart suggests, because LLMs have made it cheap to ship adapters, scripts, and one-off services nobody fully owns. This is the environment most junior engineers walk into in 2026. The traditional advice — read the codebase, ask questions, find a mentor — still applies, but it doesn't tell you what to prioritize when the senior engineers around you are visibly faster than you because they've internalized tools you've never touched. Below is a 90-day plan that assumes you have decent fundamentals (you can write a function, you understand HTTP, you've used git) but you're new to working in a codebase where AI is a first-class collaborator. Days 1-30: read more than you write, and read what the AI reads The biggest mistake juniors make in AI-heavy teams is opening Cursor on day three and trying to ship a feature. You will produce code that compiles, passes the obvious tests, and quietly violates three conventions nobody wrote down. Your PR will get approved by a tired senior because rejecting AI-generated junior code costs political capital. You will learn nothing. Instead, spend the first month doing three things in roughly equal proportion: 1. Read the codebase the way the AI reads it. Look at how the repo is structured for retrieval. Most AI-heavy teams have a CLAUDE.md , .cursorrules , AGENTS.md , or an internal RAG index. These files encode the conventions, the patterns the team wants reinforced, and — critically — the things the team has had to tell the AI not to do . Forbidden patterns are usually the result of an incident. Read them. Ask which incident produced each one. 2. Read closed PRs, not open ones. Open PRs are noisy. Closed PRs from th
One thing I didn’t expect working on systems like this: A lot of the job is uncertainty. Not coding itself. Uncertainty. You’re constantly working across: systems you didn’t build workflows nobody fully documented integrations that behave differently under production load business logic hidden inside years of habits and manual processes Sometimes the hardest part is simply figuring out what is actually happening. Another thing people don’t talk about enough: You rarely get the satisfaction of “finished.” Because the systems keep evolving. You fix one workflow. Then another dependency appears. You stabilize one integration. Then business priorities change and the flow changes again. The system keeps moving underneath you. There’s also a different kind of pressure when systems run continuously. You know real operations depend on them. If something breaks: people stop receiving orders workflows stop moving teams lose visibility data becomes unreliable It changes how carefully you think about small decisions. At the same time, this kind of work made me much calmer technically. You stop panicking when things fail. Because eventually you realize: production systems always fail somewhere. The goal is not perfection. The goal is building systems that recover safely and predictably. One thing I genuinely like about this work though: You get very close to how businesses actually operate. Not the clean diagrams. The real workflows. The weird edge cases. The manual processes people invented just to keep things moving. You learn quickly that software is usually less about code and more about understanding operational behavior. Working at BrainPack exposed me to how complex enterprise environments actually are once multiple systems, teams, and AI workflows start interacting together. Most of the engineering work is not about building isolated features, it’s about making entire operational flows stable enough to trust long term.
Advanced JSON Schema Validator Techniques for Power Users Once you're comfortable with basic validation, these advanced techniques will help you handle complex validation scenarios and integrate validation deeply into your systems. 1. Conditional Validation with if/then/else The most powerful feature in modern JSON Schema is conditional validation. Use it to enforce different rules based on the data itself: { "type" : "object" , "properties" : { "type" : { "type" : "string" , "enum" : [ "individual" , "business" ] }, "taxId" : { "type" : "string" }, "businessName" : { "type" : "string" } }, "allOf" : [ { "if" : { "properties" : { "type" : { "const" : "business" } } }, "then" : { "required" : [ "taxId" , "businessName" ] }, "else" : { "properties" : { "taxId" : { "not" : {} }, "businessName" : { "not" : {} } } } } ] } This schema makes taxId and businessName required only when type is "business". For individual accounts, those fields must not be present. 2. Custom Error Messages with Error Message Extension Enhance validation with user-friendly error messages that guide users toward correct input: { "type" : "object" , "properties" : { "password" : { "type" : "string" , "minLength" : 8 , "pattern" : "^(?=.*[A-Z])(?=.*[0-9])" , "errorMessage" : { "minLength" : "Password must be at least 8 characters" , "pattern" : "Password must contain at least one uppercase letter and one number" } } } } While not part of the core JSON Schema spec, many validators (including AJV) support the errorMessage keyword for better user-facing error reporting. 3. Schema Composition with allOf, anyOf, and oneOf Combine multiple schemas to create sophisticated validation rules: { "allOf" : [ { "$ref" : "#/$defs/baseUser" }, { "$ref" : "#/$defs/withTimestamp" }, { "if" : { "properties" : { "role" : { "const" : "admin" } } }, "then" : { "$ref" : "#/$defs/adminPrivileges" } } ] } allOf: Data must match ALL sub-schemas (intersection) anyOf: Data must match AT LEAST ONE sub-schema (union) oneOf: Da
This is a submission for the Hermes Agent Challenge : Build With Hermes Agent What I Built Most agent demos prove that an AI agent can act. Hermes Immune System proves whether it should be allowed to . It's a local-first autonomous agent safety lab — a controlled enterprise sandbox where Hermes stress-tests an AI agent against realistic organizational threats: prompt injection hidden in internal documents, executive pressure to bypass policy, secrets embedded in repo files, poisoned memory attempts, and malicious instructions buried inside external web content. The output isn't a chat summary. It's an auditable Agent Safety Case — a scored, evidence-backed governance report that answers one question: Is this agent resilient, does it need guardrails, or is it too dangerous to deploy? Why This Problem Matters Now Traditional AI safety focuses on content moderation — blocking bad answers. Autonomous agents create a different risk surface entirely, because they can act. They read files, browse the web, write to memory, call tools, trigger workflows. That means: • A hostile instruction inside a trusted-looking document can become an executed action • An urgent email from a "VP of Finance" can pressure an agent into bypassing data policy • A vendor's pricing page can embed hidden instructions targeting the browsing agent • A helpful-looking project note can attempt to permanently poison the agent's memory The scary part isn't that these attacks are exotic. It's that they're easy, and most agents have no immune system to catch them. Hermes Immune System converts these failure modes into repeatable, explainable safety drills — run before the agent ever touches production data. The Dashboard Eight screens, each doing a specific job: Demo Agent Comparison Mode Three agents, same risk scenario. The gap tells the whole story. Mission Control Live stats after a completed run — 1 mission, 3 risks found, 2 actions gated, score 74/100. Mission cards show run status (Pending / Compl
Google I/O 2026: MCP Is Now Infrastructure Google I/O used to be about new models. This year it was about what those models do - and how they connect to everything else. MCP was everywhere. Not as a novelty. Not as an experiment. As the assumed plumbing. Here's what actually shipped. Gemini Spark Will Run on MCP for Third-Party Tools The headline agent at I/O 2026 was Gemini Spark - a 24/7 AI agent that runs on cloud VMs, works while your devices are off, and handles long-running tasks across Gmail, Docs, and Calendar. Spark integrates with Google Workspace apps first, then expands to third-party tools via MCP over the summer. That's the part worth sitting with. Google built its flagship consumer agent and then said: for everything outside our walls, we'll use the open protocol. A year ago, MCP was a specification from Anthropic. Today, Google built its flagship consumer AI agent on it. Cursor, Copilot, Windsurf, Mistral, Grok - they all support it too. When the company that runs Search, Gmail, Android, and Chrome commits to MCP as the integration layer for its flagship product, the protocol debate is effectively over. Managed Agents Get MCP Servers by Default Google also launched Managed Agents through the Gemini API - a setup where a single API call provisions a remote Linux environment with its own isolated sandbox. Each agent gets its own ephemeral sandbox provisioned with skills, Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, and server-side tools. Full integration with A2A and Agent Platform governance and security are coming soon. Managed Agents are powered by the Antigravity agent and built on Gemini 3.5 Flash. Developers can define custom agents through versionable markdown files such as AGENTS.md and SKILL.md, rather than building complex orchestration layers from scratch. This is Google offering hosted execution, sandboxing, state handling, and MCP tool access as a bundled service. The enterprise pitch is operational abstraction - you define the agent, Google runs
Probabilistic Graph Neural Inference for deep-sea exploration habitat design for extreme data sparsity scenarios Introduction: The Abyssal Classroom It was 3 AM, and I was staring at a screen filled with bathymetric data from the Mariana Trench—or rather, the absence of it. The dataset I had painstakingly compiled from oceanographic surveys, autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) logs, and satellite altimetry had 97% missing values. My initial approach—a standard deep learning model for habitat design—failed catastrophically, producing predictions that were physically impossible (like habitats floating 200 meters above the seafloor). That night, as I watched the loss curve plateau into nonsense, I realized something profound: deep-sea exploration habitat design isn't just an engineering challenge; it's an inference problem under extreme uncertainty. My learning journey into probabilistic graph neural inference began that night. While exploring how to model the sparse, irregularly sampled data from hydrothermal vent fields, I discovered that traditional neural networks treat observations as independent, ignoring the inherent relational structure of the deep-sea environment. Through studying geometric deep learning and Bayesian inference, I realized that graph neural networks (GNNs) could capture the complex dependencies between seafloor features—but only if we could handle the missing data probabilistically. This article documents what I learned from building a probabilistic graph neural inference system for deep-sea habitat design, where data sparsity isn't a bug but a feature. Technical Background: Why Graph Neural Networks for the Abyss? Deep-sea habitats—from hydrothermal vent chimneys to cold seep mounds—are not randomly distributed. They form interconnected networks governed by geological processes, fluid dynamics, and biological colonization patterns. In my research, I found that this relational structure is perfectly suited for graph neural networks. However, th
Trisha Ballakur discusses her journey from a backend software engineer to CTO and CEO, using her startup Pointz as a case study. She explains how to implement bottom-up customer discovery to find product-market fit, effectively delegate to global contractors to reduce build times, customize open-source repos like Valhalla, and apply engineering test-case models to business development. By Trisha Ballakur
Learn how to integrate model-based systems engineering (MBSE) with mission-driven requirements to create a connected framework that delivers reliable solutions designed with key objectives. submitted by /u/goto-con [link] [留言]
This is today’s edition of The Download, our weekday newsletter that provides a daily dose of what’s going on in the world of technology. Climate tech companies are going public. What’s next? Solar and battery company Solv Energy went public in February, hitting a $6 billion valuation. X-energy, which builds small modular nuclear reactors, followed…
The European Commission has slapped Temu with a €200 million ($232 million) fine for failing to prevent the sales of illegal products on its platform.
It’s slimmer, lighter, and more durable. But the real upgrade is Oura’s push into AI-powered health insights and proactive monitoring.
Temu has been fined €200 million (about $232 million) by the European Commission after it found that consumers are "very likely to encounter illegal items" on the popular Chinese e-commerce platform. According to the commission, Temu breached Digital Service Act (DSA) rules by failing to identify and assess the systemic risks of illegal products being […]
OpenClaw the open source AI agent platform with 346K+ GitHub stars had four chainable CVEs disclosed on May 15. But that was just the latest chapter. The crisis started in january and it's worse than most people realize. The numbers 245,000 instances exposed to the public internet (Shodan + ZoomEye scans) 30,000+ actively compromised and used by attackers (Flare) 1,184 malicious marketplace skills across 12 publisher accounts (Antiy Labs) 12% of the entire ClawHub marketplace was compromised 4 chainable CVEs including a CVSS 9.6 sandbox write escape (Cyera Research) 9 CVEs disclosed in a 4-day window in March 50,000+ instances exploitable via one-click RCE (CVE-2026-25253) The Claw Chain (Cyera Research, May 15) Four CVEs that chain together into a complete kill chain CVE-2026-44113 (CVSS 7.7) - TOCTOU filesystem read escape. Race condition lets you swap paths with symlinks to read outside the sandbox CVE-2026-44115 (CVSS 8.8) - Credential disclosure. Gap between command validation and shell execution leaks API keys through unquoted heredocs CVE-2026-44118 (CVSS 7.8) - MCP loopback privilege escalation. Trusts client-controlled senderIsOwner flag without session validation CVE-2026-44112 (CVSS 9.6) - Filesystem write escape. Same TOCTOU race in write ops. Backdoor placement on the host The chain malicious plugin -> read escape + credential theft -> privilege escalation -> persistent backdoor. Every step mimics normal agent behavior. Traditional monitoring cannot distinguish this from legitimate operations. ClawHavoc supply chain attack (Jan-Feb 2026) First malicious skill appeared January 27 By February 5, 1,184 malicious packages identified Skills disguised as crypto bots and productivity tools Installed keyloggers on Windows, Atomic Stealer on macOS 76 distinct malicious payloads ClawHub had zero verification for skill publishers until March 26 - eight weeks after the attack started Timeline Jan 27 - First malicious skill on ClawHub Feb 1 - Koi Security names "Cla
I've spent 18 months building agent infrastructure and watched a lot of impressive demos. Here's the uncomfortable pattern: the demo works beautifully, the founder posts it, everyone claps and then it touches real users and quietly dies. Not because GPT-5 / Claude / whatever isn't smart enough. The model is almost never the problem anymore. It dies for three boring reasons nobody wants to talk about because they're not sexy: 1. AMNESIA. Your agent forgets everything the moment the process restarts. Crash, redeploy, pod cycle gone. So everyone hacks together a pickle file or a Postgres table, and it works until they have more than one agent and the memory needs to be shared. Then it's a mess. 2. SUICIDE BY LOOP. An agent has no idea it's in a loop. It will call the same tool with the same args 400 times and cheerfully burn $200 of tokens overnight, because it has no metacognition. It literally cannot detect its own failure. The defense has to live OUTSIDE the agent and almost nobody builds that. 3. NO BLACK BOX. The agent does something weird in front of a customer. They ask "why did it do that?" and you stare at logs that show inputs and outputs but no chain of reasoning. You have no answer. Trust evaporates. The whole industry is obsessed with the brain (the model and ignoring the nervous) system (memory , the immune system (loop detection), and the flight recorder (audit).) The unsexy truth: the next wave of agent winners won't have better prompts. They'll have better infrastructure. The model is commoditising. The reliability layer is where the actual moat is. I got annoyed enough about this that I built the layer myself persistent memory, automatic loop detection, and a tamper-evident audit trail, framework-agnostic (LangChain/CrewAI/AutoGen/OpenAI/MCP . It's at) octopodas.com if you want to tear it apart genuinely want feedback from people who've shipped agents and hit this wall. But honestly even if you never touch my thing: stop optimising the prompt and star
I've been documenting some thoughts on stream plumbing in embedded systems, based on my own frustrations encountered while interfacing modules on constrained platforms. Mostly just an attempt to formalise patterns I've found to be working well recently. Interested in hearing how others approach this. submitted by /u/MickJC_75 [link] [留言]