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Back in February, Uber announced ambitious plans to launch in seven new European markets in 2026 — but now five of those launches are reportedly on hold.

"Docker vs Kubernetes" is one of those framings that quietly sends people down the wrong road. It sounds like a choice between two competing tools, so teams treat it like a bake-off. It isn't. Docker builds and runs containers. Kubernetes orchestrates a fleet of them. You can happily use one without the other, and most teams should — at least for a while. The question that actually matters is hiding underneath: do I need an orchestrator yet? That's the one worth thinking about carefully, because the cost of answering "yes" too early is real, and it mostly shows up later, on a Saturday, when you're the one holding the pager. What each tool actually does Let me separate the two cleanly, because the confusion causes most of the bad decisions. Docker (or any OCI-compatible runtime — Podman, containerd, and friends) does two jobs: it builds an image from a Dockerfile , and it runs that image as a container on a host. That's the unit of packaging. When you type this: docker build -t registry.example.com/myapp:1.4.2 . docker run -d -p 8080:8080 registry.example.com/myapp:1.4.2 you've packaged your app and started it on one machine . If that machine dies, your app dies with it. If you need three copies, you start three by hand. If you push a bad image, you roll it back by hand. Kubernetes doesn't build or run containers itself — it schedules them across a set of machines and keeps them in the state you declared. You tell it "I want three replicas of myapp:1.4.2 , behind a stable network name, and if a node dies, reschedule them." Kubernetes then spends its life making reality match that declaration. So they're not competitors. Kubernetes runs your Docker-built images. The real comparison isn't "Docker vs Kubernetes" — it's "a couple of containers on a host I manage" versus "a control plane that manages containers for me." A small, honest comparison Concern Plain Docker (or Compose) Kubernetes Where it runs One host you manage A cluster of nodes If a node dies You notice and

If you're comfortable with docker compose up , you already understand more of Kubernetes than you think. Compose taught you to describe an application declaratively — services, their images, their config, how they talk to each other — instead of running containers by hand. Kubernetes is the same instinct, scaled out across a cluster, with more moving parts because it's solving a harder problem: keeping that application running when machines fail. The good news is the mental model transfers. The honest news is that the operational surface grows, and it's worth knowing exactly what changes before you commit. Let me map the concepts you already know onto their Kubernetes equivalents, show the YAML side by side, and be straight about the parts that get harder. First, the thing that doesn't change: your images This trips people up, so let's clear it early. The Docker images you already build run on Kubernetes unmodified. Kubernetes doesn't use the Docker daemon to run them — most clusters use containerd or CRI-O — but every one of those runtimes runs standard OCI images. That's the whole point of the OCI standard: the image you built with docker build is the same artifact the cluster pulls and runs. docker build -t registry.example.com/myapp:1.4.2 . docker push registry.example.com/myapp:1.4.2 That image works identically whether docker run starts it or a Kubernetes node's containerd does. So the packaging is settled. What changes is everything around the container. The concept map Here's the translation table I'd keep next to you while you learn: Docker Compose Kubernetes What changed service Deployment + Service Running vs. reachable are now two objects image: spec.containers[].image Same OCI image ports: Service (+ Ingress for external) Networking is explicit and named depends_on: probes / initContainers Ordering becomes health, not sequence environment: / .env ConfigMap / Secret Config decoupled from the pod volumes: PersistentVolume / PVC Storage is claimed, not jus

Early in building our cloud infrastructure, we had a problem nobody talks about — because it happens so slowly you almost don't notice it. We had eight separate Helm charts. One for services that needed KEDA scaling. One for standard HPA. One for backends that exposed HTTP. One for workers that didn't. One for Azure Functions. One for frontends. Eight charts, all living in the same repository, all drifting apart from each other. The charts started as copies of each other. Over time each one picked up its own fixes, its own conventions, its own slightly-different take on security contexts and ServiceAccount annotations and rolling update strategy. Nobody made a decision to diverge. It just happened. Every time we fixed something in one chart — say, wiring up Azure Workload Identity to every ServiceAccount — we had to remember to propagate that fix to seven others. Sometimes we did. Sometimes we didn't. We'd find out when something broke in an unexpected way six weeks later. Helm chart drift is more dangerous than dependency drift. At least with a dependency, you know what version you're on. With eight loosely related charts, you just don't know what you don't know. This is the story of how we replaced all eight with a single versioned chart, published to an OCI registry, and consumed by 70+ services through ArgoCD multi-source Applications — and what that structure forced us to think clearly about. The Two-Questions Framework The first thing we had to do was figure out why we had eight charts in the first place. What was actually different between services that justified a different chart? We landed on two questions: Does it expose HTTP? — This determines whether it needs an ingress, a Service, liveness/readiness probes on an HTTP path. What drives its scaling? — Standard CPU/memory HPA, or event-driven scaling via KEDA (Azure Service Bus, Event Hubs)? That's it. Everything else — security contexts, Workload Identity, pod anti-affinity, rolling update strategy, how s

While setting up a self-managed Kubernetes cluster on Azure VMs, I hit this error when running sudo kubeadm init on a Standard_B1s VM (1 vCPU / 1 GB RAM): [ERROR NumCPU]: the number of available CPUs 1 is less than the required 2 After checking Stack Overflow and the official Kubernetes documentation ("Before you begin"), I confirmed that kubeadm requires at least 2 CPUs to install the control plane. The fix: I stopped the VM and resized it from Standard_B1s to Standard_B2s (2 vCPU / 4 GB RAM) from the Azure portal, then ran kubeadm init again — the preflight checks passed and the control plane initialized successfully. Posting this in case it helps someone hitting the same issue on a low-tier cloud VM. Thanks to the community for the answers that pointed me in the right direction!

The Quest Begins (The "Why") Honestly, I was tired of playing “guess the state” every time I spun up a new environment. One day I clicked “Apply” in the AWS console, watched a handful of EC2 instances, S3 buckets, and IAM roles appear, and then realized I had no idea how to recreate that exact setup six months later when the team needed a staging copy. It felt like trying to rebuild the Death Star from memory after a single glance at the blueprints—frustrating, error‑prone, and definitely not the heroic saga I signed up for. That moment was my “aha!”: I needed a repeatable, version‑controlled way to describe infrastructure. Enter Infrastructure as Code (IaC). I’d heard the buzz, but the real question was which tool to wield—Terraform or CloudFormation? Both promised declarative provisioning, but they spoke different dialects. I decided to embark on a quest to learn both, slay the configuration drift dragon, and come out with a reusable spellbook I could share with anyone on the team. The Revelation (The Insight) The breakthrough came when I stopped thinking of IaC as “just another config file” and started seeing it as a storytelling language . Every resource block is a character, every variable a plot twist, and the state file the ever‑growing script that remembers what happened in previous chapters. When I wrote my first Terraform module, it felt like Neo realizing he could bend the spoon—suddenly the impossible became trivial. I could define a VPC, subnets, security groups, and an RDS instance in a few dozen lines, run terraform init , terraform plan , and watch the plan show exactly what would change before any resources touched the cloud. No more surprise “you created a public‑facing DB!” moments. CloudFormation, on the other hand, felt like the loyal sidekick that already lives in the AWS universe. Its JSON/YAML templates are native to AWS, so there’s no extra provider to install, and drift detection is built‑in. The trade‑off? A bit more verbosity and a steepe

Cost is everything. In just about every agentic conversation, the three things that come up for enterprises implementing AI workloads are: Cost Observability Security and as AI continues to throw everyone for a loop when it comes to cost management (e.g - Uber running out of the yearly token budget in one quarter), the ability to shrink resource (like hardware) usage will be crucial moving forward. In this blog post, you will learn how to cust costs by 90% using Agent Susbtrate in comparison to Agents running in k8s Deployments/Pods. The Cost Comparison Agents need a place to run. The "place to run" needs to be a platform that's easily managed, orchestrated, and has the ability to cluster resources. Resources like CPU, GPU, and memory need to be able to scale and expand. Without this, it's a matter of manually managing servers that Agents are running on and clients to interact with said server. That's why so many organizations choose Kubernetes to run Agentic. When running Agents per Pod, however, that can get costly very quick in terms of hardware (GPU, CPU, memory) and performance (can your cluster scale up and down quickly based on resource needs when it comes to Agents coming up and going down per use?). The tests in this blog post show: Always-on Agents running in k8s. Actors running in Workers via Agent Substrate And the comparison will be 50 always-on Pods in comparison to 50 Actors across 5-7 Workers (Pods). If there are 50 Agents running per Pod and 50 Agents running per Worker with 5-10 Actors per Pod, you can already imagine the hardware resource savings that can be accomplished. Right now, the majority of organizations start off with the "one Agent per Pod" approach as that's the fastest way to show value and get up and running. For the future, however, Agents in Actors via Agent Substrate will be how organizations deploy when they care about efficiency, optimization, and managing cost. Let's dive in from a hands-on perspective. Prerequisites To follow a

Hey everyone 👋 If you run batch jobs, data pipelines, or any kind of AI and ML training on Kubernetes, you have probably hit this wall. Kubernetes is fantastic at deciding WHERE a pod should run, but it is surprisingly clueless about WHEN a job should start. 😅 You submit ten jobs, the cluster fills up, and the rest just sit there as Pending. No real queue, no priority, no fairness between teams. One noisy team can eat all your expensive nodes while everyone else waits. 🥲 That is exactly the gap Kueue fills, and today I want to walk you through it with a pile of hands on examples you can run on any cluster, even your homelab. 🏡 👉 Key takeaway up front: Kueue is a job level manager that holds your jobs in a real queue and only admits them when there is enough quota to actually run them. 🧪 Everything in this guide was tested against Kueue v0.18.1 using the v1beta2 API. I pinned every command and manifest to that version so you do not get surprised by API drift. 📋 What we will cover ✅ Why Kubernetes needs a queue ✅ The building blocks in plain language ✅ Installing Kueue ✅ Setting up quota with a ResourceFlavor, a ClusterQueue, and a LocalQueue ✅ Submitting a Job and watching it get queued and admitted ✅ Priority based admission ✅ Partial admission and elastic jobs ✅ Multiple resource flavors for x86 and arm ✅ Fair sharing between teams with cohorts ✅ Dedicated quota with a shared fallback ✅ Queueing a plain Pod ✅ Why this matters a lot for GPUs and your cloud bill 🤔 Why Kubernetes needs a queue Native Kubernetes scheduling is pod centric. The scheduler looks at one pod at a time and tries to place it. That works great for long running services. Batch workloads are different. They have a beginning and an end, they often need a fixed chunk of capacity, and they compete with other teams for the same nodes. Without a queueing layer you get: ✅ Jobs that fail or stay Pending when resources are tight ✅ No quota governance, so one team can starve the others ✅ No admission prio

The companies confirmed to TechCrunch that their unusual partnership in Phoenix recently ended after nearly three years..

Force nginx to TLS 1.3 An nginx server is accepting an old TLS version, and the exam wants it locked to TLS one point three. The config lives in a ConfigMap. The catch is that editing the ConfigMap alone changes nothing. Let's do it the way the CKA expects. 🎥 Watch the video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rx-77YBw99w This is a CKA Workloads & Scheduling walkthrough. Every command below is real output from a live cluster, and you can reproduce the whole thing yourself (scripts at the end). The scenario An nginx-static Deployment serves HTTPS, and its server config comes from a ConfigMap named nginx-config. Right now it allows both TLS one point two and one point three. Your task is to allow only TLS one point three, then make nginx actually use the change, so that a TLS one point two request fails. nginx-static serves HTTPS from the nginx-config ConfigMap It currently allows TLS 1.2 AND 1.3 Restrict ssl_protocols to TLS 1.3 only A TLS 1.2 request to the Service must then fail How nginx, ConfigMaps, and rolling restarts fit together Two ideas drive this. First, ssl_protocols is an allow list; leave only TLSv1.3 and nginx rejects any older handshake. Second, a ConfigMap mounted into a pod updates the file on disk, but nginx only reads ssl_protocols when it starts. So you must roll the Deployment, with kubectl rollout restart, for the new value to take effect. Inspect the current state Start by seeing what is running and what the config says. The nginx-static Deployment, its Service on port four forty three, and the nginx-config ConfigMap are all here. Grep the rendered ConfigMap for the ssl_protocols line: it lists TLSv1.2 and TLSv1.3, so old clients still get in. $ kubectl -n nginx-static get deploy,svc,configmap NAME READY UP-TO-DATE AVAILABLE AGE deployment.apps/nginx-static 1/1 1 1 17h deployment.apps/tester 1/1 1 1 17h NAME TYPE CLUSTER-IP EXTERNAL-IP PORT(S) AGE service/nginx-static ClusterIP 10.96.13.162 <none> 443/TCP 17h NAME DATA AGE configmap/kube-root-ca.

Anatomy of the Trust Gap Before we can talk about the solution, we need to talk honestly about how...

After several years carrying a beta tag, the Kubernetes Security Profiles Operator went 1.0.0 on June 26, freezing eight CRD APIs and clearing a third-party security audit with no criticals. For cluster admins, the practical effect is small but consequential: the syscall and LSM profile a workload runs under is now declared on APIs that will not move under your feet. The release was announced by Sascha Grunert of Red Hat on the CNCF blog. SPO is the Kubernetes operator that manages seccomp, SELinux and AppArmor profiles as cluster-scoped objects, then attaches them to pods. Until now the value proposition was good and the API was provisional. v1.0.0 nails the second half down. What's actually stable All eight CRDs graduated to v1, including SeccompProfile , ProfileRecording , SelinuxProfile , RawSelinuxProfile , and the AppArmor profile type. Conversion webhooks ship with the release, so a cluster running earlier API versions can roll forward without scheduling downtime. The older versions remain available and are slated for removal in a future release. The migration is on the clock, not on fire. The audit pass came with some shape changes that are worth reading before you upgrade. SelinuxProfile swapped its boolean permissive field for a mode enum with Enforcing and Permissive values, which means any GitOps templates that hard-coded permissive: true need a rewrite. RawSelinuxProfile is now gated by an enableRawSelinuxProfiles configuration flag and a validating admission webhook, so the most privileged path through the operator is off by default. AppArmor inputs run through strict regex validation, raw policy payloads are capped at 500 KB, and the eBPF profile recorder picked up explicit resource limits. Why a cluster team should care The point of an operator like this is to take the profile out of the host's filesystem and into the API. That changes the blast radius of "we shipped a container with no profile at all." With SPO and a workload-attached profile, the r

Modern cloud deployments involve many tools with different lifecycles, creating a heavy burden on engineers. The Kubernetes ecosystem offers a unified Control Plane approach. Sharing best practices through tech talks and inner-source collaboration can create an engaged community and drive adoption. By Ben Linders

Google's GKE Labs has introduced OpenRL, an open-source project that provides a self-hosted API for post-training and fine-tuning Large Language Models (LLMs) on standard Kubernetes clusters. By Sergio De Simone

At this year's Microsoft Build 2026, Microsoft unveiled a broad set of enhancements to Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) aimed at making Kubernetes a first-class platform for AI training, inference, and large-scale cloud-native applications. By Craig Risi

The lawsuit, led by a Detroit pension fund, alleges Uber's board and management has cut too many compliance corners, resulting in thousands of lawsuits.

Cross-posted from the LLMKube blog . A local 27B coding model, running on hardware in my house, is a coin flip. Some runs it nails the fix in twenty minutes. Some runs it edits the wrong file, writes a test that passes no matter what the code does, and tells you it's done. The bet behind LLMKube's Foreman was never that I would find a local model good enough to trust. It was that I could build a harness I trust more than any single model's output. This weekend tested that bet harder than any benchmark could, because the harness spent the weekend building its own guardrails. Here is the short version of what happened across 0.8.12 and 0.8.13. My local coder built three new gates for itself. One of them shipped with the exact flaw it was written to catch, and the review caught it. Three new contributors sent four clean pull requests while the machines worked. The same model ran on an AMD box and an Apple Silicon Mac, and the Mac quietly won a round nobody expected. And not one byte of any of it touched a cloud API. The thesis, stated plainly Trust the harness, not the model. A coding agent on a local model produces output of wildly variable quality, and no amount of prompt tuning makes a 27B as reliable as a frontier model. So Foreman does not ask the model to be reliable. It wraps the model in a pipeline that is : the coder works in a cloned workspace, a fast in-workspace gate runs gofmt, vet, build, lint, and the unit tests for the packages it touched; a reviewer reads the diff against the issue; and a clean-room Kubernetes Job re-runs the full suite before anything is allowed to call itself a GO. Around all of that sit deterministic rails: scope checks, edit-free-streak detection, repo-map context. The model is a stochastic component inside a system whose job is to make the system's verdict trustworthy even when the component is not. The interesting question is never "is the model good." It is "does the harness catch the model when it is bad." This weekend gave me

TL;DR: I built a .NET library that renders Helm charts and drives Kubernetes releases without shelling out to the helm CLI. 129/129 templates across ingress-nginx, cert-manager, external-dns, podinfo, and metrics-server now render successfully. The main entry point is HelmSharp.Action, with lower-level packages available for chart loading, rendering, Kubernetes operations, and release storage. MIT licensed, looking for feedback and early adopters. Why I Built This At work, our .NET services deploy to Kubernetes through Helm. Every Docker image had to bundle the helm binary — another dependency to manage, another layer in the image, another surface for CVEs. I wanted to cut that out entirely and do Helm-style rendering directly in-process. The .NET ecosystem doesn't really have this. There are YAML libraries. There are Kubernetes client libraries. There are template engines. But nothing ties them together the way helm template does — values merging, named templates, include , range , toYaml , the whole Sprig function set, all wired into a single render pipeline. So I started building one. (This is also my first real open source project — I'd spent years consuming OSS without contributing back, and HelmSharp is what came out of deciding to change that.) What HelmSharp Does HelmSharp is a multi-package .NET SDK (net8.0 / net9.0 / net10.0) that covers: Package What it does HelmSharp.Action High-level Helm client — TemplateAsync , UpgradeInstallAsync , RollbackAsync HelmSharp.Chart Chart loading from directories and .tgz , values merging, --set / --set-json style overrides HelmSharp.Engine Helm-style template rendering — 100+ Sprig/Helm functions HelmSharp.Kube Kubernetes apply, delete, and wait (no kubectl needed) HelmSharp.Release Release history stored in Kubernetes Secrets (Helm-compatible) HelmSharp.Repo Chart repository index, pull, and search Plus Registry , Storage , PostRenderer extension points Here's the lower-level rendering API — no result objects, no stdout

The scary part of an agent-driven container escape is not the container escape. That sounds wrong, so let me be precise. The primitives in Sysdig's latest threat research are not new magic. A mounted Docker socket has been a bad idea for years. Over-permissioned Kubernetes service accounts have been a bad idea for years. Privileged containers are dangerous. Host namespace tricks are dangerous. Secrets reachable from application pods are dangerous. None of this should surprise anyone who has had to review production Kubernetes setups with a straight face. The new part is the operator. Sysdig observed what it describes as an LLM-harness-driven attacker exploiting a vulnerable marimo notebook, enumerating the container and host environment, using the Docker socket as an escape path, creating privileged containers, reading host credentials, and replaying a Kubernetes service-account token to dump Secrets. That is the part worth sitting with. Not because the agent invented a new class of exploit. Because it made the old mistakes compose faster. the attack surface was already there Most security incidents are not movie plots. They are boring edges left open long enough for someone to connect them. In this case, the edges are familiar. An internet-reachable application had a vulnerability. The workload had access to a Docker socket. The container environment exposed enough information to enumerate possible escape paths. A Kubernetes service-account token was available. The token had enough RBAC to read Secrets. Secrets contained useful downstream credentials. That is not one bug. That is a chain of assumptions. The application team may have thought about the notebook vulnerability. The platform team may have thought about the Docker socket as a convenience for one workflow. The Kubernetes team may have thought the service account was scoped "only" to a namespace. The security team may have had runtime alerts somewhere in the backlog. Each decision can look locally tolerabl

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