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Interesting Paper Exploring Prompt Injection

This is a fascinating explotation of how LLMs fall for prompt injection attacks. It turns out that they learn to recognize the style of text in different role/instruction blocks, and not just the tags. Their conclusion: Role tags were a formatting trick that became the security architecture and the cognitive scaffolding of modern LLMs. We’ve shown that this architecture doesn’t survive into the model’s actual representations, and that such role confusion is linked to prompt injection. Unless LLMs achieve genuine role perception, we think injection defense will remain a perpetual whack-a-mole game. And the continuous nature of role boundaries opens the threat of injections designed to subtly shift LLM states through seemingly innocuous text, legally and at scale...

2026-06-25 原文 →
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The 124 best tech deals for day three of Prime Day

It’s day three of Prime Day, folks. We’re nearly 75 percent of the way through Amazon’s four-day sales event, and unsurprisingly, many deals are still sticking around. There have been all kinds of discounts on things like TVs, smart home gadgets, chargers, headphones, and more. Prime Day typically isn’t as big of a deal as […]

2026-06-25 原文 →
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Is this solar e-bike a good idea or sophisticated e-waste?

I like the idea of a solar-powered electric bike, but I don't think anyone should buy the new Phosgo Go5 - not yet, anyway. This "world's first AI solar e-bike" promises to "eliminate range anxiety," and is sold by a new brand out of China hoping to make a big splash by selling direct-to-consumer through […]

2026-06-25 原文 →
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Presentation: Rust at the Core - Accelerating Polyglot SDK Development

Spencer Judge discusses the architectural pattern of building a shared core in Rust with language-specific layers on top. Drawing from his work on Temporal's SDKs, he shares lessons on navigating FFI boundaries, bridging async concepts, and managing memory safely. He explains the limitations of native extensions and how emerging tech like WebAssembly can streamline cross-language architecture. By Spencer Judge

2026-06-25 原文 →
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What Europe’s heat wave means for the power grid

It’s been hard to look away from headlines about the European heat wave this week. Temperatures are breaking records across the continent, and the weather is threatening lives, shutting down schools, and in one particularly ironic case, forcing the cancellation of a London Climate Action Week event about extreme heat. As the summer ramps up…

2026-06-25 原文 →
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Introducing kreuzcrawl v0.3.0

kreuzcrawl began as a Rust core with bindings for ten languages. v0.3.0 ships fourteen, adds a tiered WAF-aware dispatch engine, cuts peak streaming memory from ~2.5 GB to ~20 MB, and enables SSRF defense across every outbound call path by default. It is the first release we consider API-stable. This post covers what changed, why each decision was made, and what the harder engineering problems looked like from the inside. At a glance Area v0.2.0 v0.3.0 Language bindings 10 14 (+Dart, Kotlin/Android, Swift, Zig) Peak streaming memory ~2.5 GB ~20 MB SSRF protection opt-in on by default Dispatch model static HTTP / bypass / browser tiered, signal-driven escalation WAF fingerprints — 35 across 8 vendors Fingerprint hot-reload — lock-free ( ArcSwap ), 500 ms debounce MCP tools partial 1:1 with CLI, safety-annotated CLI subcommands scrape, crawl + batch-scrape, batch-crawl, download, citations Robots / sitemap parsers engine-internal public modules API stability preview stable Four new language bindings v0.2.0 shipped Rust, Python, Node.js, Ruby, Go, Java, C#, PHP, Elixir, and WebAssembly. v0.3.0 adds Dart , Kotlin/Android , Swift , and Zig — bringing the total to fourteen. None of the per-language glue is written by hand. Every binding is generated from the Rust core by alef , our polyglot binding generator. The Dart and Kotlin/Android packages bind through the C FFI layer ( kreuzcrawl-ffi ) via dart:ffi and JNI respectively. Swift binds through clang. Zig uses @cImport against the same C header. The generation pipeline also hardened in this release: the Docker publish matrix now builds each architecture natively rather than via QEMU emulation, the Dart build no longer requires the Flutter SDK for pub.dev publishes, Swift artifactbundle checksums are injected automatically, and the Elixir/PHP/Ruby releases preserve their lock files through the source-publish step. === "Python" ```sh pip install kreuzcrawl ``` === "Node.js" ```sh npm install @xberg/kreuzcrawl ``` === "Rus

2026-06-25 原文 →
AI 资讯

The Security Bug Every Node.js Developer Ships to Production

Last year I was doing a code review for a startup. Everything looked fine on the surface, clean code, good structure, tests passing. Then I noticed this: const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = ' ${ req . body . email } '` That's it. That's the bug. SQL injection, sitting right there in a startup that had been in production for 8 months. Nobody caught it. Not the developer, not the reviewer, not the CTO. Here's the thing, it's not that developers are careless. It's that this kind of bug is invisible until it isn't. The code works perfectly. Tests pass. Users are happy. Until someone types ' OR '1'='1 in the email field and walks straight into your database. The bugs I see most often 1. Raw SQL with user input // 🚨 This is everywhere const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = ' ${ email } '` // ✅ Use parameterized queries const query = ' SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = $1 ' db . query ( query , [ email ]) 2. Secrets in environment variables... committed to git # .env DATABASE_URL = postgres://user:actualpassword@prod-db.company.com/mydb STRIPE_SECRET = sk_live_... Then .env ends up in the repo because someone forgot to add it to .gitignore . I've seen this more times than I want to admit. GitHub's secret scanning catches some of these, but not always before someone has already cloned the repo. 3. JWT tokens that are never actually verified // 🚨 Decoding is not the same as verifying const user = jwt . decode ( token ) // ✅ Always verify const user = jwt . verify ( token , process . env . JWT_SECRET ) jwt.decode just reads the token. Anyone can forge it. jwt.verify actually checks the signature. The names are confusingly similar and the wrong one silently works in development. 4. No rate limiting on auth endpoints // 🚨 Anyone can try a million passwords app . post ( ' /login ' , async ( req , res ) => { const user = await db . findUser ( req . body . email ) // ... }) // ✅ Add rate limiting const authLimiter = rateLimit ({ windowMs : 15 * 60 * 1000 , m

2026-06-25 原文 →