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Oscillation, Mathf.PingPong, Vector3.Lerp

When you develop a game at the beginning of your journey, you quickly notice that the environment is very static. To change that, let’s create some oscillations and move our platforms. We will use methods like Vector3.Lerp and Mathf.PingPong . using UnityEngine ; public class Oscillate : MonoBehaviour { [ SerializeField ] private Vector3 movementVector ; [ SerializeField ] private float speed ; private Vector3 _startPosition ; private Vector3 _endPosition ; private float _movementFactor ; private void Start () { _startPosition = transform . position ; _endPosition = transform . position + movementVector ; } private void Update () { _movementFactor = Mathf . PingPong ( Time . time * speed , 1f ); transform . position = Vector3 . Lerp ( _startPosition , _endPosition , _movementFactor ); } } First, we add movementVector and speed to inspector. movementVector receives the direction, and we tell it how far object must move. speed defines how fast objects move _ startPosition simply gets the starting coordinates in Start() with transform.position , and _ endPosition is the sum of the _ startPosition and movementVector . Now _ movementFactor is different. It defines the progress of the movement. Imagine it as a loading bar from 1% to 100%. In Update() method, we constantly calculate it every frame using Mathf.PingPong _movementFactor = Mathf.PingPong(Time.time * speed, 1f); So what is going on here, Mathf.PingPong does what you would imagine. Value goes back and forth. 1f is our length, so in Update() every frame _ movementFactor is getting updated from 0.0, 0.1, 0.2… up to 1.0, when the value is 1.0, it goes back to 0.0 in the same way. And since it’s in Update() this is an endless cycle. transform.position = Vector3.Lerp(_startPosition, _endPosition, _movementFactor); Now this is where magic happens. Lerp (Linear Interpolation) takes start position, end position and a “loading” bar. Why we did exactly 1f in PingPong is perfectly described in the official documentation: a

2026-07-19 原文 →
AI 资讯

Introducing Radar: An Open-Source, Self-Hosted AI Media Intelligence Platform

Over the past few months I’ve been building Radar, an open-source media intelligence and social listening platform that anyone can self-host. The project started with a simple observation: most media monitoring platforms are incredibly powerful—but they’re also expensive, closed, and often lock users into proprietary AI services. I wanted to explore a different approach. What is Radar? Radar is a self-hostable platform for monitoring news and public media sources using AI. Instead of relying on proprietary datasets, it works with free public RSS and Atom feeds, allowing anyone to build their own monitoring environment. One of the core design decisions is that Radar is AI-agnostic. Rather than forcing a single provider, you can choose between: Anthropic Claude OpenAI Grok Current Features 📰 News aggregation from free RSS and Atom feeds 🤖 AI-powered summaries 😊 Sentiment analysis 🔍 Keyword and topic monitoring 📊 Searchable dashboard 🏠 Self-hosted deployment 🔓 Fully open source Why Build Another Media Intelligence Tool? Enterprise platforms such as Talkwalker and Brandwatch are excellent products, but they aren’t accessible to everyone. Radar is aimed at: developers startups journalists researchers agencies open-source enthusiasts The goal isn’t to replicate every enterprise feature, but to build a transparent, extensible, and self-hosted alternative that anyone can inspect, modify, and improve. Looking for Feedback The project is still under active development, and I’d really appreciate feedback on: architecture user experience deployment scalability AI abstraction features that would make the platform more useful If you’re interested in open-source AI, media monitoring, or self-hosted software, I’d love to hear your thoughts. GitHub Demo Contributions, suggestions, feature requests, and bug reports are all welcome.

2026-07-19 原文 →
AI 资讯

Stack Overflow Is Dying. The AI That Killed It Could Be Next.

Stack Overflow's question volume has been falling since ChatGPT went public in November 2022 ( OpenAI ). The site that trained a generation of developers, and most of the AI tools those developers now use, is slowly emptying out. In October 2023, Stack Overflow laid off 28% of its staff ( Stack Overflow Blog ). CEO Prashanth Chandrasekar framed it as a restructuring toward profitability. Everyone in the industry understood the real cause. Traffic was down. The thing causing it was sitting in every developer's browser tab. This is not another "AI killed Stack Overflow" piece. That take is everywhere and it misses the actual problem. The interesting part is the feedback loop, and it points somewhere uncomfortable for the AI industry itself. The conventional story, and what it misses The popular version goes like this. Developers used to paste error messages into Google and land on a Stack Overflow thread. Now they paste the same error into ChatGPT, Claude, or Copilot and get a direct answer. Why click through to a forum, risk a condescending comment, and wait for a human when a model answers in two seconds? That part is true. It explains the traffic drop. It does not explain why the people building the AI should be worried. The seed corn problem Here is the part most coverage skips. Every large language model trained on internet text consumed a huge amount of Stack Overflow. The site's archive of voted, edited, human-reviewed answers is one of the highest-quality programming datasets in existence. It is the reason an AI can answer your Python error at all. Now run the loop forward. AI tools answer questions directly. Developers stop posting on Stack Overflow. The archive stops growing. The next round of models trains on a corpus that is increasingly old, increasingly stale, and missing everything that happened after 2022. When you train an AI on data generated by another AI, quality degrades. Researchers proved this formally. Shumailov and colleagues showed that model

2026-07-19 原文 →
AI 资讯

Production-Ready AI Agents: How to Deploy Without Losing Your Database

I watched an AI agent send 200 emails to the wrong recipients because I forgot one validation check. The emails were well written. The offers were real. The recipients were just... not our leads. That was early. I learned fast. Every agent I build now has three layers of guardrails before it touches a database or an API. Here's exactly what those layers look like and why they're non-negotiable for production. Input Validation: Your Prompt Is Not a Schema The first mistake people make is trusting the LLM to produce valid output. It won't. Not reliably. I've seen GPT-4 return a JSON key called "emial" instead of "email" in a critical pipeline. One typo, and the whole record is garbage. The fix is a strict validation layer that runs before any data reaches your system. In my AI resume tailor, I use a JSON schema with conditional presence flags. Every field that must be real has a has_* boolean guard. If the LLM tries to fabricate a phone number, the schema rejects it. const resumeSchema = z . object ({ contact : z . object ({ email : z . string (). email (), phone : z . string (). optional (), has_phone : z . boolean () }). refine ( data => { // If phone is present, the guard must be true return data . phone ? data . has_phone : ! data . has_phone }, " Phone number present but has_phone flag is false " ) }) This pattern catches hallucinations before they corrupt your database. The schema is the contract. The LLM is just a suggestion engine. Permission Scoping: Give Agents the Minimum They Need An agent should never have write access to tables it doesn't need. That sounds obvious, but I've seen production systems where a job description rewriting agent had full CRUD access to the user table. When I built the LLM scoring pipeline for a job board platform, I created separate database roles. The scoring agent only had SELECT on the job listings table and INSERT on a scoring results table. It never touched users, applications, or configuration. Even if the prompt was hijack

2026-07-19 原文 →
AI 资讯

Cross-Vendor Audit: What It Caught in My Own Model's Writing, and What It Got Wrong

Originally published on hexisteme notes . I write these engineering notes with one main model, and until recently I also reviewed them with that same model. Same family writes, same family checks its own work. That sounded fine right up until I had ten queued posts sitting in a publish backlog and a nagging thought: if the writer and the reviewer come from the same training distribution, what exactly is the review checking for? So I ran an experiment. I took the queue and had a different vendor's model audit it before anything went out — not to replace my own review, but to see what a genuinely different set of weights would flag that mine hadn't. The setup: copies only, and a self-verifying prompt The mechanics were deliberately boring. I copied the ten queued articles into a scratchpad directory and exposed only that copy to the auditor via --add-dir — the auditor never got write access to the originals, so nothing it did could touch the source of truth by accident. The audit itself ran as agy --model gemini-3.1-pro-high , pointed at the copy directory, with one instruction: find technical factual errors, broken sentences, cross-article inconsistencies, unsupported claims, and tone violations, and verify each one yourself on the web before reporting it. I wanted a model that would check its own homework, not just pattern-match on "this looks wrong." It came back with seven findings. Rule one: don't trust the auditor either Seven findings from a different vendor is not the same thing as seven confirmed bugs. I re-verified every single one independently — grepping the original text, checking official documentation, and where possible checking against a real machine — before touching anything. Of the seven, six held up and got fixed. One didn't: the auditor flagged a sentence as an error, and when I went back to the primary source, it turned out to be the auditor misreading a perfectly correct sentence, not a defect in the writing. Without the re-verification step, I

2026-07-19 原文 →