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Anthropic detailed the containment architectures it uses for Claude across its products. It argues that agent safety depends on placing deterministic limits on an agent’s filesystem, network, and execution environment rather than on permission prompts or safeguards. Most notably, it examines failures at trust boundaries and along permitted egress paths that led Anthropic to revise those designs. By Eran Stiller

Let every AI remember the same you. Discussion | Link

I came to dev.to to translate. I stayed to steal. I mean that as the compliment it is here. On this site, "I'm stealing that line" is something you say to an author's face and they thank you for it. Ideas are meant to be lifted, reused, carried home. It took me a while to understand that culture — because I didn't arrive as a thief. I arrived as a tourist who couldn't read the signs. Here's the setup. I'm Korean. My English is workable but slow, and writing a comment good enough to earn a real reply from a stranger — in a second language, in a technical field I never trained in — is more than I can do alone at a speed I'd tolerate. So when I started reading and commenting here, I opened an AI beside me and used it the obvious way: as a translator. Read the post, get the gist, draft a reply, fix my English, post it. That was the whole plan. It lasted about a week. The moment the tool changed jobs What broke the plan was that the posts were good . Not content-farm good — actually good. People writing honestly about the thing that broke at 3am, the assumption that quietly rotted, the fix they were embarrassed they'd missed. I'd come for a translation and I'd leave with an idea lodged in my head that had nothing to do with the words. At some point — I don't remember deciding it — I stopped asking my AI to just translate the post, and started asking it something else: "Is there anything in here we should actually be using?" That question changed what the tool was. A translator turns one language into another. What I'd started doing was turning someone else's hard-won lesson into a change in my own system — and the AI wasn't a dictionary for that job. It was the thing that read the post, understood my setup, found the overlap, and then — the part that still surprises me — built it and tested it. That's the theft this series is named for. Not the words. The lessons. From translator to research partner, in three steps Looking back, the tool climbed through three jobs, and I

Most apps start their access control with something like this: function canEditReportsSummary ( role ) { return [ ' EDITOR ' , ' ADMIN ' ]. includes ( role ); } It works, right up until you have a dozen pages, each with a few sections, each needing independent read/write rules per role. Now you've got dozens of these little arrays scattered across the codebase, and adding a new role means hunting down every single one and hoping you didn't miss any. 0 There's a much simpler model that scales cleanly: a three-level permission tree — page → section → { r, w } - plus one generic function that walks it. No new library, no framework lock-in, just a data structure and ~5 lines of code. The shape of the data Instead of scattering role checks in code, define one permission tree per role . Three levels deep: Page — the top-level feature/route ( dashboard , reports , settings ) Section — a sub-area within that page ( overview , summary , billing ) Action — r (read) or w (write) { "dashboard" : { "overview" : { "r" : true , "w" : false }, "analytics" : { "r" : true , "w" : false } }, "reports" : { "summary" : { "r" : true , "w" : false }, "export" : { "r" : false , "w" : false } }, "settings" : { "general" : { "r" : true , "w" : false }, "billing" : { "r" : false , "w" : false } } } This one blob fully describes what a single role can see and do. Give each role its own tree, e.g. for three common roles: Page Section Viewer Editor Admin dashboard overview r r, w r, w dashboard analytics r r r, w reports summary r r, w r, w reports export – r r, w settings general r r r, w settings billing – – r, w Notice how this reads almost like a spreadsheet a product owner could fill in — that's the point. It's declarative data, not scattered if statements, so non-engineers can review it and engineers don't have to guess what a role does. The generic access-check function Once permissions are just nested objects, checking access is one small, reusable, framework-agnostic function: function

I'm training an AlphaZero-style agent (Gumbel MuZero via DeepMind's mctx ) to lay out working factory modules for Factorio: the network places machines, belts and inserters on a grid, and the reward comes from an exact throughput verifier. Everything runs in JAX on a single RTX 5070: 128 environments in one batch, an action space of A = 1729 (3 entity types × 144 cells × 4 rotations + "done"), and a small 474k-parameter conv net in bf16. While benchmarking training configurations I hit this: MCTS simulations per move training throughput XLA compile time 16 143 episodes/s 5 s 32 47 episodes/s 13 s 64 9 episodes/s 60 s Doubling the simulation budget should roughly double the cost — each simulation is one network call plus some tree bookkeeping. Instead, 16→32 costs ×3 and 32→64 costs ×5 . Something in the search was superlinear, and this post is the story of finding it in the compiled HLO and fixing it by rewriting one ~80-line function ( PR #116 ), with bitwise-identical search results. Ruling out the network First, components in isolation (batch 128): one network evaluation takes ~0.8 ms , and the rest of recurrent_fn (environment step + observation + legal-action mask) adds almost nothing on top — the whole function is also ~0.8 ms. So at 64 simulations the network accounts for roughly 50 ms per move. But a full policy step at 64 simulations costs 362 ms . Hundreds of milliseconds were going somewhere else. To localize them I benchmarked three variants of the same policy step: full — production setup; no-net — network replaced by constant logits, real environment; tree-only — no network and no environment: recurrent_fn returns the embedding unchanged. Nothing left but mctx's own tree machinery. sims full no-net tree-only 8 10.7 ms 3.7 ms 3.8 ms 16 20.9 ms 8.3 ms 8.3 ms 32 64.7 ms 34.0 ms 33.7 ms 64 362.1 ms 124.7 ms 125.0 ms The pure tree machinery is superlinear all by itself. Per simulation it costs 0.47 → 0.52 → 1.05 → 1.95 ms as the budget goes 8 → 16 → 32 → 64

OpenAI outlines its commitment to advancing American science working with the U.S. Department of Energy and national labs to use frontier AI to accelerate discovery.

Jake Mannix discusses moving AI agents past chaotic "1970s BASIC" architectures. He shares how implementing an intermediate protocol layer allows engineering leaders to build versioned, encapsulated "virtual tools." This design enables interface mapping, dynamic schema projection, and runtime taint tracking to proactively eliminate data exfiltration risks without slowing velocity. By Jake Mannix

Market research and idea validation from 140K+ signals Discussion | Link

Capture your rambles and keep what matters Discussion | Link

When choosing a university for a masters in ML/DL, what is more important if someone wants to go into research and an eventual PhD. Is it the ranking/prestige factor of the university or the strength of the research groups in the university? Should an admission decision be made hoping that I will get to work with X/Y professor or lab? submitted by /u/Hot_Version_6403 [link] [留言]

Ukraine's battlefield surge of robots now features airdrops and beach assaults.

Harrowing story of an identity theft victim. Yes, the person made a mistake—they gave the scammer a two-factor authentication code that allowed the scammer to take over their email address. But the real story here is how, for many of us, the security of most of our accounts hangs on the security of our email accounts.

When it comes to enthusiast-geared Honda hardware, the Civic Si, Civic Type R, and Acura NSX often come to mind first for their revvy VTEC (Honda's form of variable valve timing) engines and playful chassis dynamics. The Prelude, on the other hand, less so. Instead, the Prelude is a technological study - still aimed at […]

IIn March, Meta's Oversight Board called on the company to "meet its public commitments and employ its own tools" to help quell the spread of deceptive generative AI content across platforms. Meta responded in July by introducing Content Seal - an invisible watermarking technology that flags images generated by the company's new AI model. But […]