标签：#c

Outside experts—some with a vested interest in peptides—recommended adding a number of the amino acids to the FDA's bulk list, including the “Wolverine stack” touted by Joe Rogan and other influencers.

Your people, your agents, your project — all in one place Discussion | Link

I'm a long-time macOS user and I just want a change. Curious what people here actually use every day and what made you stick with it. Curious if you also switched from a Mac too. I'd like to get out of the "walled garden" ecosystem.

The breathalyzer identifies the amount of acetone in your breath to determine if your body is in ketosis.

TL;DR Croc GUI is a free desktop app for schollz/croc — encrypted peer-to-peer file transfer with drag-and-drop, QR codes (via getcroc.com ), and LAN mode. macOS, Windows, Linux. MIT licensed. Download: GitHub Releases Why I built this I send files with croc constantly. End-to-end encrypted, cross-platform, no vendor cloud. The CLI is perfect — until you're helping someone who doesn't have a terminal open. Croc GUI is the Send/Receive desktop app I wanted: same croc binary, clearer UX. What it does Send — drag files/folders, get a code phrase + QR link Receive — paste a code, pick a download folder Share — copy phrase, getcroc.com URL, or full croc … command Local-only — croc --local for LAN peers Zip — pack on send, unpack helper on receive Options — relay, port, proxy, overwrite, auto-confirm What it doesn't do Reimplement croc's crypto or protocol Upload anything to a GUI-specific cloud Claim to be an official schollz project Transfer engine: schollz/croc . Please sponsor schollz . Stack UI: React + TypeScript Shell: Tauri 2 (Rust) Engine: bundled croc binary per platform Dev quick start git clone https://github.com/interfluve-wav/croc-gui.git cd croc-gui/gui npm install npm run bundle:croc:download npm run tauri:dev Try it Platform Installer macOS (Apple Silicon) Croc_* (Apple Silicon).dmg macOS (Intel) Croc_*_x64.dmg Windows Croc_*_x64-setup.exe Linux .deb or .AppImage ⭐ Star on GitHub · 🐛 Issues

You built something. Tests pass. You're days from mainnet. Before you either skip security entirely (please don't) or spend weeks lining up a full audit, here's a self-check you can run in 20 minutes that catches the mistakes I see most often in first-time deployments. I run security reviews for small and new protocols, and the same handful of issues come up again and again. None of these need a tool — just your eyes and this list. 1. Who can call what? Open every external / public function that moves funds, mints, pauses, or upgrades. For each, ask: should a random address be able to call this? If not — is there an onlyOwner / onlyRole / require(msg.sender == ...) guarding it, in the function itself or in every internal function it calls? The classic bug isn't a missing modifier. It's a function that looks unguarded but delegates to a guarded internal one (fine), or one that looks guarded but the guard is in a branch a caller can skip (not fine). Trace the call, don't trust the signature. 2. The first-depositor trap (if you have a vault) If you mint shares from deposits (ERC-4626 or anything share-based), the first depositor can sometimes donate assets directly to the contract to inflate the share price, so the second depositor rounds down to zero shares and loses funds. Fix: virtual shares, a dead-shares mint at deploy, or a minimum-liquidity lock. OpenZeppelin's ERC-4626 handles this out of the box — a hand-rolled vault usually doesn't. 3. Reentrancy — but only the real kind Not every external call is reentrancy. It's a bug when an attacker-controlled call can re-enter and corrupt shared storage before you've updated it. Quick checks: Do you update state before the external transfer (checks-effects-interactions)? Is there a nonReentrant on functions that move value? Is the call target a trusted, immutable contract, or an arbitrary address the attacker supplies? A call to a protocol-owned contract, or a memory /local variable written after the call, is usually not