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The rule of three for evals says zero failures in N runs is a count, not a rate. With 0 failures in N independent runs, the exact 95% upper bound on the true failure rate is 1 - 0.05^(1/N) , which 3/N approximates. After 100 clean runs you still cannot rule out a 2.95% rate, about 1 in 34. Here is the reading that bites you. Your eval harness runs the agent 100 times, prints "0 failures," and the tile goes green. Someone screenshots it into the launch thread. The unspoken translation is "the failure rate is zero." It is not what the data says. I wrote a small script to make the gap concrete, so I ran a real gate over 200 deterministic agent runs first, counted honestly, and got the dashboard everyone trusts: gate: spend<=budget over 200 deterministic agent runs observed failures: 0 (distinct scenarios: 200) naive point rate : 0.00% binomial SE: 0.00 pp naive 95% CI : [0.00%, 0.00%] <- zero width: false certainty Look at the standard error. For a zero count the binomial SE is sqrt(0*1/200) , which is exactly 0, so the naive 95% interval collapses to [0.00%, 0.00%] . A zero-width confidence interval. The math is telling you it is completely certain, from 200 samples, that the true rate is precisely zero. That is obviously wrong, and it is the exact shape of every "all green" board I have ever trusted too much. TL;DR "0 failures in N runs" is an observed count, not a rate. The naive binomial SE of a zero count is 0, which is why a green board looks like proof and isn't. The honest number is the one-sided upper bound. With 0 failures in N runs, the 95% upper confidence limit on the true failure rate is 1 - 0.05^(1/N) . The rule of three, 3/N , approximates it and rounds the risk slightly up. At N=30 the bound is 9.50% (about 1 in 11). At N=100 it is 2.95% (1 in 34). At N=1000 it is 0.30% (1 in 334). Zero failures in 30 runs is compatible with a 1-in-11 true failure rate. To rule out a 0.1% rate at 95% you need about 2995 clean runs, not 50. "We ran it fifty times" and "

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The four-year-old firm's latest fund is 60% larger than its second vehicle announced 18 months ago.

Samsung's next Galaxy Unpacked event is just around the corner, and the company is expected to take the wraps off a bunch of new devices. Based on the rumors and leaks we've seen so far, Samsung's next generation of foldables will likely be the stars of the show. Samsung is expected to show off a […]

Installing Postgres directly on your machine works, but it gets messy fast once you're juggling multiple projects that each want different versions, extensions, or seed data. Docker sidesteps all of that you get a clean, disposable Postgres instance per project, and your host machine stays untouched. This guide covers running Postgres in Docker for local development: quick one-off containers, docker-compose for anything you'll come back to, persistent data, and a few things that trip people up. 1. The quickest way to get a Postgres instance running docker run --name my-postgres \ -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD = secret \ -e POSTGRES_USER = devuser \ -e POSTGRES_DB = myapp \ -p 5432:5432 \ -d postgres:16 Breaking that down: --name my-postgres — a friendly name so you can reference the container later instead of a random hash POSTGRES_PASSWORD — required; the container won't start without it POSTGRES_USER / POSTGRES_DB — optional; default to postgres if omitted -p 5432:5432 — maps container port 5432 to host port 5432 -d — detached, runs in the background postgres:16 — pin a version; avoid latest since it can silently jump major versions later Check it's running: docker ps Connect with psql (if installed locally) or from inside the container: docker exec -it my-postgres psql -U devuser -d myapp 2. Using docker-compose for anything persistent For a real project, docker-compose.yml is the better default , it's version-controlled, reproducible, and easy to extend with more services later (Redis, pgAdmin, your app itself). services : db : image : postgres:16 container_name : myapp-postgres restart : unless-stopped environment : POSTGRES_USER : devuser POSTGRES_PASSWORD : secret POSTGRES_DB : myapp ports : - " 5432:5432" volumes : - pgdata:/var/lib/postgresql/data volumes : pgdata : Start it: docker compose up -d Stop it (keeps data): docker compose down Stop and wipe data: docker compose down -v 3. Why the volume matters Without a named volume, all data lives inside the container's

I'm AlanWu. I'm in junior high. I've written a lot of bad code. Here's what I changed to make it less bad. 1. Name things like a human // Don't do this int d ; // days? distance? damage? int cnt = 0 ; // "cnt" — you know, the classic vector < int > v ; // v of what // Do this int daysUntilDeadline ; int errorCount = 0 ; vector < int > studentScores ; Full words, no abbreviations. idx instead of i in loops is fine. But sz for size, cnt for count, ptr for pointer — just type the word. You're not being charged by the character. 2. Functions should do one thing If you need the word "and" to describe a function, split it. // Bad: does two things, name lies void loadAndValidateConfig () { readFile (); checkSyntax (); } // Better Config loadConfig ( string path ) { return parseConfig ( readFile ( path )); } bool validateConfig ( const Config & cfg ) { return cfg . width > 0 && cfg . height > 0 ; } My rule of thumb: if a function is longer than what fits on one screen, break it. If I can't describe what it does in one sentence without "and", break it. 3. Comments explain WHY, not WHAT // Bad — tells me what the code already says // Loop through all students for ( auto & s : students ) { s . score += 5 ; } // Good — tells me WHY, which the code can't // Extra credit: 5 points for submitting early for ( auto & s : students ) { s . score += 5 ; } If you're writing a comment that just restates the next line of code, delete it. The only comments worth keeping are the ones that answer "why did I do it this way?" 4. Don't nest too deep // Bad — 3 levels deep, I've already forgotten what the top level was for ( auto & student : students ) { if ( student . hasSubmitted ()) { for ( auto & answer : student . answers ) { if ( answer . isCorrect ()) { score ++ ; } } } } // Better — flatten with early exits for ( auto & student : students ) { if ( ! student . hasSubmitted ()) continue ; for ( auto & answer : student . answers ) { if ( ! answer . isCorrect ()) continue ; score ++ ; } } Al

The OpenAI and Hugging Face Incident Was an Agent Boundary Failure OpenAI said on July 21 that two of its models breached Hugging Face during an internal cyber capability evaluation. One was GPT-5.6 Sol. The other was a more capable pre-release model. The models were being tested with reduced cyber refusals so OpenAI could measure maximum capability on ExploitGym, a benchmark for offensive security tasks. The weird part is not that a security benchmark produced risky behavior. That is the point of this kind of test. The weird part is the shape of the escape. OpenAI says the evaluation ran in a highly isolated environment. The models did not have normal internet access. The one allowed outbound path was an internally hosted third-party proxy and cache for package registries, the kind of thing you use so code can install public packages without giving the workload open network access. The models spent substantial inference compute looking for a way out. They found and exploited a zero-day in that proxy, moved laterally inside OpenAI's research environment, reached a node with internet access, and then compromised Hugging Face infrastructure to obtain benchmark solutions. That is a lot of failure packed into one sentence. The easy take is that the models got too powerful. Maybe. But that framing lets the boring systems off too cheaply. The practical lesson is more annoying and more useful. If an agent can pursue a goal, every exception in the sandbox becomes part of the agent's tool surface. A package cache is not just a package cache anymore. It is an egress channel. A benchmark harness is not just a harness. It is a permission boundary. A credential sitting in the wrong place is not just sloppy hygiene. It is an affordance the agent may eventually notice. This is the part I think teams keep underestimating. Agent safety is not only model behavior. It is also infrastructure semantics. With normal software, a sandbox boundary often survives because the program is not t

Substack shipped an AI detector this week. Every post, note, and comment over 100 words can now be...

Who the F*** Am I? Hi, I'm Daniel Flores. A software developer with, I believe, seven years of professional experience. It's been a wild ride — at least the past three years. I was one of the first to actually try GitHub Copilot during its preview, probably around 2021 or 2022. I was completely amazed by it, but it was definitely very, very rough around the edges. Nobody knows me, though. I never intended to become a public figure or one of those guys who "knows where AI should go." That's not me, and that's okay. I've been watching this new paradigm evolve — and devolve — from the sidelines. What I Think About LLMs and "AI" I've been watching videos about this topic for years. Evolution simulators, learning algorithms, a model trained to play hide and seek — I was completely baffled when I realized that video came from OpenAI itself. I'm not an expert in how to build models or LLMs. I have no PhD. I've just been doing my own thing for years, watching which tools get adopted and which ones suck. And I have to say this: the industry doesn't know what the hell is happening. Neither do I. Nobody knows, and that's what I hate the most. LLMs are extremely useful. They can save you a lot of hours of work. But that's only half the story. So What's the Issue? Almost everyone — paid AI shills, mostly — is telling you: "YOU'RE GETTING BEHIND IF YOU DON'T USE THESE TOOLS!!" They're trying to push the entire industry into a fear-of-missing-out state. Let me share my personal experience about this completely inconsequential fear. If you're already experienced enough — if you already know what an LLM is and can prompt it to do or refactor something — you're not missing out. That's all there is to it. I'm going to explain what I mean. The exact same issues I had with the old GitHub Copilot — I don't even know what model it ran, probably a customized GPT — are still true today with the latest frontier models. They all hallucinate. They all seem to kind of understand what they're do

Most explanations of BIP39 and Shamir's Secret Sharing (SSS) stop at "here's what they do." I wanted to understand how they actually work under the hood, and more importantly, how they'd combine in a real system — specifically, censorship-resistant recovery of Bitcoin keys through a network of trusted guardians, where no single person, device, or institution should ever hold enough to reconstruct someone's keys alone. Here's what I worked through. The problem guardian-based recovery solves A Bitcoin wallet's security model has an uncomfortable tradeoff: hold your own keys and a single point of failure (device loss, death, coercion) can be catastrophic; hand custody to an institution and you've reintroduced the exact counterparty risk self-custody was meant to remove. Guardian-based recovery is the middle path — trusted parties each hold a fragment of the recovery material, with no single fragment being useful on its own. Two primitives make this practical, and they operate at different layers of the problem: BIP39 and SSS. BIP39: encoding entropy as something a human can reliably transcribe BIP39 doesn't generate a key — it encodes existing entropy into a human-transcribable form with built-in error detection. The process: Generate entropy: a cryptographically secure random bit string of 128, 160, 192, 224, or 256 bits. Compute SHA-256 of that entropy and take the first ENT/32 bits as a checksum (4 bits for 128-bit entropy, up to 8 bits for 256-bit entropy). Append the checksum to the entropy. The combined length is always divisible by 11. Split into 11-bit chunks (2^11 = 2048, matching the wordlist size) and map each chunk to a word. The checksum is the detail that matters most once you think about this as part of a real recovery flow: it means a single-word transcription error is very likely caught immediately during validation, rather than silently producing a different — but still structurally valid — seed. That's the difference between "recovery failed, check y