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AI coding startup Cognition has acquired Poke, the AI assistant you text like a friend, in a deal valuing the startup in the low nine figures. The acquisition brings Poke’s conversational style and interaction model to Cognition’s coding agent Devin, reflecting a growing belief that how AI assistants interact with users is as important as the models powering them.

The offline messaging app surged in popularity in India amid protests in New Delhi.

The first time I audited seriously, I opened the biggest contract in the repo and started reading line one. Two hours later I had a headache and zero findings. I had memorized how the code worked without ever asking what it was supposed to guarantee. That is backwards, and it took me a while to unlearn it. Now I do not read Solidity first. I read the scope, and before I look at a single function body I write down what must always be true. Bugs are violations of those truths. If you do not know the truths, you are just admiring the code. Step one: write the invariants before you read An invariant is a property the protocol claims will always hold, no matter who calls what in what order. For a contest, I start with money and control, because that is where severity lives. Two questions cover most of it: Who can move funds, and under what conditions? What must always hold about the accounting? For a lending-pool-shaped protocol my starting invariant list looks like this, written in plain language before I care how any of it is implemented: The sum of all user deposits minus all borrows equals the pool's available liquidity plus outstanding debt. Accounting must reconcile. A user can only withdraw up to their own balance, never more, never someone else's. A position can only be liquidated when it is actually under the health threshold. Interest accrues monotonically, it never goes backwards in a way that lets someone repay less than they owe. Only the borrower, or a liquidator on an unhealthy position, can reduce a debt. Nobody except governance can change interest rate parameters or the oracle. Notice none of that mentions a function name. These are the promises. Now my job for the rest of the contest is simple to state: find an ordering of calls that breaks one of these. Step two: map the external entry points Funds do not teleport. Something has to be called from outside for state to change. So I list every externally reachable function, because the attack surface is

You built something. Tests pass. You're days from mainnet. Before you either skip security entirely (please don't) or spend weeks lining up a full audit, here's a self-check you can run in 20 minutes that catches the mistakes I see most often in first-time deployments. I run security reviews for small and new protocols, and the same handful of issues come up again and again. None of these need a tool — just your eyes and this list. 1. Who can call what? Open every external / public function that moves funds, mints, pauses, or upgrades. For each, ask: should a random address be able to call this? If not — is there an onlyOwner / onlyRole / require(msg.sender == ...) guarding it, in the function itself or in every internal function it calls? The classic bug isn't a missing modifier. It's a function that looks unguarded but delegates to a guarded internal one (fine), or one that looks guarded but the guard is in a branch a caller can skip (not fine). Trace the call, don't trust the signature. 2. The first-depositor trap (if you have a vault) If you mint shares from deposits (ERC-4626 or anything share-based), the first depositor can sometimes donate assets directly to the contract to inflate the share price, so the second depositor rounds down to zero shares and loses funds. Fix: virtual shares, a dead-shares mint at deploy, or a minimum-liquidity lock. OpenZeppelin's ERC-4626 handles this out of the box — a hand-rolled vault usually doesn't. 3. Reentrancy — but only the real kind Not every external call is reentrancy. It's a bug when an attacker-controlled call can re-enter and corrupt shared storage before you've updated it. Quick checks: Do you update state before the external transfer (checks-effects-interactions)? Is there a nonReentrant on functions that move value? Is the call target a trusted, immutable contract, or an arbitrary address the attacker supplies? A call to a protocol-owned contract, or a memory /local variable written after the call, is usually not

Bill would let Homeland Security chief decide when an AI should be shut down.

Users can also integrate their personal data from services like Apple Health, Function, and MyFitnessPal.

Etched, founded by three Harvard dropouts, has created new chips and memory components that speed up inference on any AI model -- no GPUs required, it says.

Ford is the first automaker to use a new set of developer tools that will let it embed Apple Maps navigation and mapping directly into its vehicles' infotainment systems.

Here are the best delivery services and meal kits in 2026, including Martha Stewart’s meal service, a GLP-1–supportive plan, and a budget-friendly option.

There's a romantic idea about Bitcoin's chain: that it's a wall of human messages. Proposals, memorials, "Vahe was here," pizza jokes, the occasional protest note pinned into the world's most expensive append-only log. I wanted to know if that was actually true. So I counted. Every OP_RETURN output, from the genesis block to block 958,893, no sampling. The answer is no, and it's not close. The one number All human-readable OP_RETURN text ever mined into Bitcoin: 3,827,227 outputs. Runes, one token protocol, in its own era: 171,114,058 OP_RETURN outputs. That's a ratio of 44.7 to 1 . One machine protocol, in a single two-year stretch, wrote about 45 times more to the chain than every human-readable message in Bitcoin's entire history combined. The evidence, per era I split the chain into four eras by block height, not by any label stored in my database. Height boundaries are canonical and anyone can check them against a node, so the result doesn't depend on trusting my extractor's tags. era height range boundary event pre-ordinals 0 – 767,429 before the first inscription ordinals 767,430 – 779,831 inscription #0 to BRC-20 deploy boom-brc20 779,832 – 839,999 BRC-20 ordi deploy to Runes runes 840,000 – 958,893 Runes launch at the halving Then I counted the full population of OP_RETURN outputs in each era. Human-readable text, Runes token messages, and binary blobs (Veriblock and OMNI proof-of-proof timestamping, mostly). era total OP_RETURN human text human % Runes Runes % binary binary % pre-ordinals 51,965,944 861,532 1.66% 7 0.00% 51,103,723 98.34% ordinals 261,767 32,189 12.30% 3 0.00% 229,544 87.69% boom-brc20 2,980,954 402,161 13.49% 40,251 1.35% 2,538,248 85.15% runes 177,474,762 2,531,345 1.43% 171,114,058 96.42% 3,828,604 2.16% Here's the honest twist When I started, I expected to find a fall. A golden human era that machines later ate. That's the clean story, and it's wrong. Look at the human % column again. Human text was never the majority of OP_RETURN. Not

It's a year of refinement for the Galaxy Watch. With the new Galaxy Watch 9 and Galaxy Watch Ultra 2, which are being announced today, Samsung is more or less taking what people like about its watches and tweaking those elements to be better. The company has been doing this for the past few generations […]

Anthropic and OpenAI's aggressive 2026 acquisition sprees set the stage for a weekend rumor.

Samsung's next Galaxy Unpacked event is just around the corner, and the company is expected to take the wraps off a bunch of new devices. Based on the rumors and leaks we've seen so far, Samsung's next generation of foldables will likely be the stars of the show. Samsung is expected to show off a […]

Most explanations of BIP39 and Shamir's Secret Sharing (SSS) stop at "here's what they do." I wanted to understand how they actually work under the hood, and more importantly, how they'd combine in a real system — specifically, censorship-resistant recovery of Bitcoin keys through a network of trusted guardians, where no single person, device, or institution should ever hold enough to reconstruct someone's keys alone. Here's what I worked through. The problem guardian-based recovery solves A Bitcoin wallet's security model has an uncomfortable tradeoff: hold your own keys and a single point of failure (device loss, death, coercion) can be catastrophic; hand custody to an institution and you've reintroduced the exact counterparty risk self-custody was meant to remove. Guardian-based recovery is the middle path — trusted parties each hold a fragment of the recovery material, with no single fragment being useful on its own. Two primitives make this practical, and they operate at different layers of the problem: BIP39 and SSS. BIP39: encoding entropy as something a human can reliably transcribe BIP39 doesn't generate a key — it encodes existing entropy into a human-transcribable form with built-in error detection. The process: Generate entropy: a cryptographically secure random bit string of 128, 160, 192, 224, or 256 bits. Compute SHA-256 of that entropy and take the first ENT/32 bits as a checksum (4 bits for 128-bit entropy, up to 8 bits for 256-bit entropy). Append the checksum to the entropy. The combined length is always divisible by 11. Split into 11-bit chunks (2^11 = 2048, matching the wordlist size) and map each chunk to a word. The checksum is the detail that matters most once you think about this as part of a real recovery flow: it means a single-word transcription error is very likely caught immediately during validation, rather than silently producing a different — but still structurally valid — seed. That's the difference between "recovery failed, check y

Over the past decade, streaming platforms competed by dominating individual formats like music, video, podcasts, or audiobooks. Now, as AI makes it easier to create, organize, and recommend content, those distinctions are fading, pushing companies like Spotify, Netflix, YouTube, and TikTok to become all-purpose entertainment destinations instead.

Twitch is giving parents more control over how their children are using the streaming platform, including the ability to block them from broadcasting entirely. Parental controls are now available that allow guardians to link Twitch accounts with their 13- to 17-year-old children, providing account management features and a weekly email summarizing their teen's activity, including […]

The director role for the Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI) has become a revolving door since David Sacks left his position as czar.

Last week I was reviewing the staking engine of a protocol before its mainnet launch. Deep in a 1,400-line contract, I found what looked like a serious bug. The reward math multiplied three values before dividing: uint256 delta = (lot.amount * rBase * midpointRate) / (RAY * RAY); Multiply-before-divide. If that intermediate product overflows uint256 , the whole epoch settlement reverts — and since every stake , withdraw , and setStake runs it, the post's funds get permanently frozen . That's a High-severity, fund-locking DoS. I had the finding half-written. lot.amount can reach 10M tokens ( 1e25 ). rBase grows with elapsed time. midpointRate can hit RAY . Multiply those and you blow past 2^256 ... I was ready to send it. Then I did the one thing that separates a real audit from false-positive spam: I checked the actual constants before writing the claim. uint256 private constant RAY = 1e18; // I'd assumed 1e27 RAY was 1e18 , not the 1e27 I'd been carrying in my head. And the interest rate had a hard cap — MAX_RATE_MAX_RAY = 5e18 , enforced even against a fully-captured timelock. I ran the numbers with the real values: For that multiplication to overflow, the protocol would need to go 2.3 × 10¹⁵ years without a single state update. Not reachable. The bug didn't exist. I deleted the finding. Why this matters more than the bug would have If I'd sent that report, here's what happens: the team's engineer clones the repo, plugs in the real constants, and realizes in ten minutes that I flagged an overflow that can't happen. Every other finding in my report now gets read with a raised eyebrow. My credibility — the entire product — is gone. This is the dirty secret of automated smart-contract auditing: the bottleneck isn't finding issues. It's not drowning the real ones in false positives. Anyone can run a scanner and paste 40 "criticals." A team that has to triage 40 flags to find the 2 that matter will — correctly — stop trusting you. The bar I hold: zero false positives o

Written by Marlowe Finch, archival bloodhound at Bitcoin Institute. Bitcoin has been decentralized and trustless since block zero. No CEO, no committee, no kill switch, no single person who can rewrite the rules. That's the pitch. It's why the whitepaper still gets quoted like scripture. Block 74638 does not agree with the pitch. What actually shipped in that block On August 15, 2010, a transaction landed in the Bitcoin blockchain with two outputs. Each one paid out 92,233,720,368.54277039 BTC . Combined: over 184 billion BTC — roughly nine thousand times the 21 million BTC that will ever exist, created in a single transaction. The validation code, CheckTransaction() , checked that each individual output was non-negative. It never checked whether the sum of the outputs overflowed. Two values chosen just under INT64_MAX, added together, wrapped around to a negative number in signed 64-bit arithmetic. A 0.5 BTC input, compared against that negative sum, satisfied the "input covers output" check. The transaction validated. The block got mined. Every rule the network was running said this was fine. That's CVE-2010-5139. It is also, by any dollar value you want to apply, the most expensive missing bounds-check ever shipped to production. So who hand-builds a transaction engineered to overflow a signed 64-bit integer, and what does a currency with a hard 21-million-coin cap do when someone mints nine thousand times that in one block? The archive's full account of the incident lays it out block by block . The receipts 18:08 UTC, August 15 — Jeff Garzik opens a BitcoinTalk thread titled "Strange block 74638", pastes the raw block dump, and closes with one question: "92233720368.54277039 BTC? Is that UINT64_MAX, I wonder?" 20:38 UTC — Satoshi Nakamoto, to the bitcoin-list mailing list, network-wide: "*** WARNING *** We are investigating a problem. DO NOT TRUST ANY TRANSACTIONS THAT HAPPENED AFTER 15.08.2010 17:05 UTC (block 74638) until the issue is resolved." 20:39 UTC — Ga

Databricks has remade its image into an AI company and has published research on the cost savings of open weight AI models for coding.