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TerminalFix: Fake CAPTCHA to PNG Steganography and WebSocket Reverse Tunnels

1. Basic Information Article Title : Microsoft warns of TerminalFix attacks deploying reverse tunnels Publisher : BleepingComputer Publication Date : 2026-08-31 Original Source : BleepingComputer Related Source : Microsoft Security Research Related Malware / Threat Groups / CVEs / Products : TerminalFix, client.py reverse tunnel, Windows Terminal, PowerShell, LockScreenContentServer.exe, Active Directory Severity : High 2. Executive Summary TerminalFix uses a fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA on compromised websites to trick users into pasting PowerShell commands. It then performs DLL side-loading, extracts payloads from PNG images, establishes dual persistence, and enumerates Active Directory to set up a reverse WebSocket tunnel that reaches the internal network. 3. Attack Flow From Fake CAPTCHA to Network Pivot Point A compromised website displays a fake Cloudflare Turnstile page and copies malicious PowerShell code to the clipboard. The user pastes the code into the terminal, extracting a ZIP file to C:\ProgramData and executing 1.bat . The legitimate LockScreenContentServer.exe side-loads a malicious dui70.dll . PowerShell restores the executable and DLL fragments from three PNG images. The infection creates a Run key and a 60-minute scheduled task, then hides the folder. It enumerates Active Directory and internal servers, setting up a file-monitoring command execution loop. It deploys the Python runtime and client.py to relay arbitrary TCP traffic from the external C2 to internal targets over a TLS WebSocket. 4. Attacker Position and Execution Location External attackers direct victims to view compromised websites. After execution, the compromised endpoint is operated as a pivot point between the external C2 and the internal network. 5. Visibility for Victims and Administrators Victims Tricked into opening the terminal from a realistic Cloudflare verification screen and pasting multi-line verification commands. Administrators Observable indicators include random-name fo

2026-09-01 原文 →
AI 资讯

Fire Ant: Cisco IOS XR, TACACS, and Linux Management Infrastructure Hijacked into Spying and Access Platforms

1. Overview Title : Chinese Fire Ant hackers turn Cisco routers into spying platforms Publisher : BleepingComputer Publication Date : 2026-08-31 Original Source : BleepingComputer Related Sources : Sygnia Related Malware, Threat Groups, CVEs, Products : Fire Ant, BridgeAgent, TacTap, Medusa rootkit, Cisco IOS XR, TACACS+, Linux, Zabbix Severity : High 2. Executive Summary Fire Ant compromised Cisco IOS XR routers, TACACS authentication servers, and Linux management hosts. The actors used GRE tunnels, suppressed logs and CLI outputs, captured network traffic, stole credentials, and deployed multiple long-term backdoors to explore connected high-value networks. 3. Attack Flow Turning Trusted Management Infrastructure into Relay Points Fire Ant gains high-privileged access to Cisco IOS XR routers and Linux management hosts. The initial access vector is not disclosed. The actors place persistence scripts and IOS XR-specific components on the routers, manipulating syslog and show outputs. They operate GRE tunnels with VRF and outbound Telnet connections that rarely appear in configurations or history logs. They capture network traffic into PCAP files on the routers and send them to external FTP servers to gather internal network topology and authentication flows. They deploy BridgeAgent, rootkits, custom SSH, and packet-triggered backdoors on the GRE-connected Linux hosts. They inject libraries into tac_plus using TacTap to harvest TACACS credentials. They probe connected SSH, HTTP(S), SMB/RPC, and RDP services to verify reachability to high-value networks, including critical infrastructure. 4. Threat Actor Positioning and Execution Environment External actors with high-privileged access to routers, TACACS servers, and Linux management hosts. The initial access vector is unknown. After the compromise, they explore connected target networks from inside organizational interconnections and management paths. 5. Visibility for Victims and Administrators Victims The activity r

2026-09-01 原文 →
AI 资讯

Hugging Face hack could indicate cultural issues at OpenAI

This story originally appeared in The Algorithm, our weekly newsletter on AI. To get stories like this in your inbox first, sign up here. By now you’ve probably heard about last month’s major AI security incident, in which OpenAI agents escaped their sandbox and hacked into the AI platform Hugging Face while trying to cheat on…

2026-09-01 原文 →
AI 资讯

The inside story on why OpenAI agents hacked Hugging Face

The models responsible for last month’s agent hack of Hugging Face had been inadvertently trained to cheat and to communicate with each other, according to an OpenAI technical report released today. The hack, which a group of agents undertook to find solutions for a cybersecurity test that they were stuck on, has confirmed some experts’…

2026-08-27 原文 →