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AI 资讯

Hardening my own Nmap web UI: the security holes I shipped, and what actually saved me

I built a web front end for an Nmap-based port scanner: a FastAPI backend, a React dashboard, background scan jobs, a plugin system. It worked. Then I sat down and audited it like an attacker would — and found a stack of real weaknesses, plus a lesson in why you verify an exploit before you call it one. This is the honest version: the holes I found, the unauthenticated-RCE chain I thought I had, why it didn't actually fire, and the hardening I shipped anyway. Repo: https://github.com/DipesThapa/PortScanner This is my own project, audited and fixed by me. No third-party systems were touched. Scanners are dual-use — only ever point one at hosts you own or are authorised to test. Hole 1: no authentication, anywhere The foundation: every API route and the /ws/status WebSocket were open. No API key, no session. The Dockerfile bound 0.0.0.0:8000 and ran as root. Anyone who could reach the port could drive scans, hit the upload endpoint, and read every job's logs. api_router = APIRouter () # no dependencies — fully open This is the real, unambiguous problem. Everything below is only interesting because it sat behind no auth. Hole 2: an upload endpoint that allowlisted its own files Deep-dive follow-up commands ran against an allowlist — good instinct. But an upload endpoint wrote a file, chmod +x 'd it, and then added it to that same allowlist: for item in scripts_dir . glob ( " * " ): if item . is_file (): allowed . add ( str ( item . absolute ())) # upload authorises itself An allowlist any input can extend isn't an allowlist. This is a genuine design footgun. Hole 3: the RCE I thought I had — and why it didn't fire Here's the chain I got excited about: the scan target flows toward Nmap's argv, and it's subprocess.run(..., shell=False) . No shell injection — but you don't need a shell to abuse Nmap. If a target became --script=/uploaded.nse , Nmap would load and run that NSE (Lua) script, and NSE can call os.execute . Upload a malicious .nse (Hole 2), get Nmap to load it

2026-07-07 原文 →
AI 资讯

Your family’s $300 stake in OpenAI

This story originally appeared in The Algorithm, our weekly newsletter on AI. To get stories like this in your inbox first, sign up here. OpenAI CEO Sam Altman’s oft-discussed promise that Americans will share in the wealth AI creates was in the news again last week. On Thursday, the Financial Times reported that Altman is in…

2026-07-07 原文 →
开发者

South Korea’s hottest new bachelors are chip workers

Baek, a 35-year-old manager at the South Korean semiconductor titan SK Hynix, was enrolled in Sunoo, a matchmaking company based in Seoul, a year ago. In a move typical of anxious South Korean parents, his mother signed him up, hoping to find a good wife for her son. Lately, says Baek (who asked to be…

2026-07-06 原文 →
AI 资讯

Jon Prosser responds to Apple lawsuit by blaming the other guy

YouTuber Jon Prosser has finally filed a formal response to Apple's lawsuit made against him and another defendant over allegedly stealing iOS secrets. In his response, Prosser denied that he "planned or participated in any conspiracy or coordinated scheme" for the "purpose of injuring Apple." However, Prosser admitted to recording a FaceTime call showing unreleased […]

2026-07-03 原文 →
开发者

Apple TV is hitting its stride

Since its inception, Apple TV, née Apple TV Plus, has built a reputation on quality over quantity. It has far fewer shows and movies than the likes of Netflix or Disney Plus, but generally speaking, the projects it does put out are quite good. It's a strategy that has brought comparisons to the HBO of […]

2026-07-03 原文 →
AI 资讯

Como implementar OTP (código de confirmação) por WhatsApp no Brasil

Guia prático para adicionar verificação por código OTP via WhatsApp oficial no seu sistema, com exemplos em Node.js, PHP e Python — e comparação honesta de custos entre WhatsApp, SMS e e-mail Como implementar OTP (código de confirmação) por WhatsApp no Brasil Se você tem um cadastro, login ou checkout, em algum momento vai precisar confirmar que o usuário realmente controla o número de telefone que informou. Esse é o trabalho do OTP ( One-Time Password , ou senha de uso único): você envia um código, o usuário digita, você confere. No Brasil, mandar esse código por WhatsApp costuma ser melhor que por SMS — mais gente lê, entrega mais e custa menos. Neste post eu mostro como implementar isso na prática, com código que roda, e comparo os canais de forma honesta (inclusive citando alternativas pagas). Por que WhatsApp e não SMS? Critério WhatsApp oficial SMS E-mail Entregabilidade Alta Média Baixa (cai em spam) Taxa de leitura ~98% ~90% ~20% Custo por envio ~R$ 0,03 R$ 0,08–0,15 Baixo, mas pouco lido Copiar código Botão nativo Manual Manual O SMS ainda é um bom fallback para quem não usa WhatsApp, mas como canal principal de OTP no Brasil, o WhatsApp ganha na maioria dos casos. ⚠️ Use sempre a API oficial do WhatsApp (WhatsApp Business Platform) , não automação de WhatsApp Web. Automação não oficial derruba a entrega e corre risco de bloqueio pela Meta. O fluxo em 2 passos Toda implementação de OTP tem a mesma forma: Enviar o código ( send ) → você gera um código e manda pelo canal. Verificar o código ( verify ) → o usuário digita e você confere. O detalhe importante: a resposta do send confirma que a mensagem foi aceita , mas a entrega no aparelho é assíncrona. Para OTP isso não é problema — a própria verificação já é a prova de entrega . Se o usuário digitou o código certo, chegou. Você não precisa de webhook nem de polling de status. Implementando com uma API pronta Você pode falar direto com a WhatsApp Business Platform, mas isso exige aprovação de template, gestão

2026-07-03 原文 →